Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

190 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
a long memorandum for the benefi t of Marshall, an “Estimate
of the Situation December 1, 1941–March 31, 1942.” 18 G-2 was
responsible for the collection, interpretation, and distribution of
information about our enemies or potential enemies. G-2’s duties
included codes and ciphers and liaison with other intelligence
agencies. 19 Th e assistant chief of staff of G-2 was on the list to
see MAGIC, and presumably Miles, as acting assistant chief of
staff also had access to this information derived from reading the
Japanese “Purple” intercepts. 20
Miles presented a rather complete analysis of the situation
from the Army’s viewpoint. His memorandum 21 in brief:
Th is estimate is addressed to the objective of Nazi defeat. Its
purpose is to examine the factors of strength and weakness and
of strategic positions of the Nazis and of their opponents, in
order to present the military possibilities and probabilities during
the period December 1, 1941, to March 1, 1942.
Miles went on to review the military situation in the Atlantic,
Europe, Middle East, and the Pacifi c.
Germany, “though weakened by her losses in Russia, will
remain the only power capable of launching large scale strategic
off ensives.” She was not “in a position [at this time] to attempt an
invasion of the [British] islands,” and if she did attempt it, it “will
be delayed until mid-summer of 1942.”
18Ibid., part 14, pp. 1373–83.
19 Mark Skinner Watson, Th e War Department: Chief of Staff : Prewar Plans and
Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Division,
1950), p. 73.
20 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 36, p. 23, McCollum testimony
before the Hewitt Inquiry.
21Ibid., part 14, pp. 1373–84. Miles memorandum and Supporting Estimates.