Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

The Countdown Begins 189
southeast Asia and the Dutch East Indies. Japanese residents,
especially women and children, had been evacuated from British
India, Singapore, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines,
Hong Kong, and Australia, and many had been withdrawn from
the United States, Canada, and South America. 14
Admiral Wilkinson made an appointment at noon on
December 1 to go with McCollum to see Chief of Naval
Operations Stark. As McCollum later testifi ed, “We knew that
the Japanese fl eet was ready for action. We knew that it had been
called home, docked and extensively repaired and was looking for
action.” Also the Japanese fl eet had just changed its call signs and
frequency allocations again after only a relatively short interval.
Th is change in radio transmissions, when considered in conjunction
with the various other clues, was one further indication that
something was afoot. 15
Wilkinson, in subsequent testimony, said that “On the evidence
available we had concluded…that the Japanese were contemplating
an early attack, primarily directed at Th ailand, Burma,
and the Malay Peninsula.” 16 At the meeting with Stark, both
Wilkinson and McCollum “urged that a dispatch of warning be
sent to the fl eet at that time.” Stark assured them that such a dispatch
had already been sent—on November 27—and that it had
defi nitely included the phrase, “Th is is a war warning.” 17
The Army’s December 1 View of Atlantic
and Pacific Theaters of War
Under date of December 5, Brigadier General Sherman
Miles, acting assistant chief of staff , G-2 (Intelligence), prepared
14Ibid., part 15, pp. 1839–42; part 36 (Hewitt Inquiry Exhibit #10), pp.
659–60.
15 Ibid., part 36, p. 17, McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.
16 Ibid., part 4, p. 1847, Wilkinson testimony before the Joint Committee.
17Ibid., part 36, p. 19, McCollum testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.