Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

186 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
wanted in the way of materials if Japan’s military leaders would
only show that Japan intended to pursue a peaceful course.
Hull said
that we do not propose to go into partnership with Japan’s military
leaders; that he has not heard one whisper of peace from
the Japanese military, only bluster and blood-curdling threats.
He also brought up Japan’s ties to Germany through the
Tripartite [Germany-Japan-Italy] Pact. In view of Japan’s commitment
to her ally, Germany, he said, Japan could not expect
the United States to stop helping her friends, Britain and China.
Kurusu
felt it was a shame that nothing should come out of the eff orts
which the conversations of several months had represented. He
said he felt that the two sides had once been near an agreement
except for two or three points, but that our latest proposals
seem to carry the two sides further away than before.
Hull responded
that every time we get started in the direction of progress the
Japanese military does something to overturn us. Th e Secretary
expressed grave doubts whether we could now get ahead in
view of all the threats that had been made.
Th e Secretary pointed out that we all understand what are
the implications of such terms as “controlling infl uence”, “new
order in east Asia,” and “co-prosperity sphere.”. . . Hitler was
using similar terms as synonyms for purposes of conquest.
Kurusu “disclaimed on the part of Japan any similarity between
Japan’s purposes and Hitler’s purposes.”