Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

184 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Hull and the Japanese Ambassadors
Exchange Strong Words
On December 1 the ambassadors called on Hull as
scheduled.
Upon [their] arrival at the State Department, [they] found
not only newspaper men, but even some members of the
Departmental staff crowding the corridors. Some of these
speculators [spectators?] were of the opinion that the issue of
war or peace was to be immediately decided upon. In general,
the scene was highly dramatic. 10
Th e meeting with Hull was long, and their conversation got
off to a rough start when he brought up Tojo’s “bellicose utterances
emanating from Tokyo.” Th e ambassadors responded with
tact: In the United States, they said, you “seem to take a more
serious view of the Japanese Prime Minister’s utterances than
was warranted.” Th e ambassadors told Hull that the document
he had handed them on November 26, the “ultimatum” with its
ten points, “had been communicated to the Japanese government,”
which was now studying the case. Th ey expected “within
a few days” to receive their government’s “observation thereon.”
However, they wished the United States would reconsider its
rejection of the proposed Japanese modus vivendi.
Hull then remarked that we had learned of “heavy Japanese
troop movements into Indochina.” He criticized Japan for moving
into Indochina so suddenly “without any advance notice to
this Government.” We can’t overlook Japan’s digging herself into
Indochina, Hull said. It
create[s] an increasing menace to America and her friends.
. . . [W]e will not allow ourselves to be kicked out of the
10 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, pp. 210–11, December 1 cable
#1225 of Japanese ambassadors to Tokyo.