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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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180 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

“technically” negotiations had not yet been broken <strong>of</strong>f . However,<br />

the U.S. government did not expect the Japanese government to<br />

accept its proposals.<br />

Halifax called on Hull the next day to check on the outcome<br />

<strong>of</strong> the conversations FDR <strong>and</strong> Hull had been having with the<br />

Japanese. Hull blamed in part the “hysterical cable messages” sent<br />

by Chiang Kai-shek <strong>and</strong> his aides. Hull wished Churchill had sent<br />

a strong cable to Chiang in response to his “loud protest about<br />

our negotiations . . . telling him to brace up <strong>and</strong> fi ght.” Churchill’s<br />

expression <strong>of</strong> concern at Chiang’s “very thin diet” had resulted in<br />

“virtually killing what we knew were the individual views <strong>of</strong> the<br />

British Government toward these negotiations.” Th us Chiang’s<br />

November 25 cables to <strong>of</strong>fi cials all around the world urging that<br />

the United States reject any form <strong>of</strong> a modus vivendi with the<br />

Japanese had persuaded the United States to drop the U.S. proposal<br />

for a three-month modus vivendi <strong>and</strong> to submit in its place<br />

a ten point “ultimatum.” Th e Japanese ambassadors had not been<br />

optimistic about their government’s willingness to agree to the<br />

United States’ ten points. Although the Japanese government had<br />

not as yet replied, Hull said “the diplomatic part <strong>of</strong> our relations<br />

with Japan was virtually over [<strong>and</strong>] the matter will now go to the<br />

<strong>of</strong>fi cials <strong>of</strong> the Army <strong>and</strong> the Navy.” Hull also told Halifax “in<br />

great confi dence” that he expected some action on the part <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Japanese before long.<br />

[I]t would be a serious mistake for our country <strong>and</strong> other countries<br />

interested in the Pacifi c situation, to make plans <strong>of</strong> resistance<br />

without including the possibility that Japan may move<br />

suddenly <strong>and</strong> with every possible element <strong>of</strong> surprise <strong>and</strong> . . .<br />

capture certain positions <strong>and</strong> posts before the peaceful countries<br />

interested in the Pacifi c would have time to confer <strong>and</strong><br />

formulate plans to meet these new conditions. 2<br />

2 Ibid., pp. 685–87, Hull November 29 memor<strong>and</strong>um <strong>of</strong> conversation.

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