Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
8. The Countdown Begins U.S.-Japanese Negotiations Broken Off U.S. “naval offi cials in London had been informed by the Navy Department that negotiations between Japan and the United States had been broken off and that an immediate movement by Japan was anticipated.” 1 When British Ambassador Lord Halifax heard this, he abruptly returned to Washington from Philadelphia where he had planned to weekend. Th e British government was “greatly excited” at the news. Halifax called on Undersecretary of State Welles that Friday evening, November 28, to see if it was actually true. As far as Welles knew, the situation was exactly as it had been the night before: the Japanese ambassadors had submitted the U.S. government’s statement to their government: no reply had as yet been received, so that 1Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1941, vol. 2: Th e Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1956), pp. 684–85, Welles November 28 memorandum of conversation with Halifax. 179
180 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy “technically” negotiations had not yet been broken off . However, the U.S. government did not expect the Japanese government to accept its proposals. Halifax called on Hull the next day to check on the outcome of the conversations FDR and Hull had been having with the Japanese. Hull blamed in part the “hysterical cable messages” sent by Chiang Kai-shek and his aides. Hull wished Churchill had sent a strong cable to Chiang in response to his “loud protest about our negotiations . . . telling him to brace up and fi ght.” Churchill’s expression of concern at Chiang’s “very thin diet” had resulted in “virtually killing what we knew were the individual views of the British Government toward these negotiations.” Th us Chiang’s November 25 cables to offi cials all around the world urging that the United States reject any form of a modus vivendi with the Japanese had persuaded the United States to drop the U.S. proposal for a three-month modus vivendi and to submit in its place a ten point “ultimatum.” Th e Japanese ambassadors had not been optimistic about their government’s willingness to agree to the United States’ ten points. Although the Japanese government had not as yet replied, Hull said “the diplomatic part of our relations with Japan was virtually over [and] the matter will now go to the offi cials of the Army and the Navy.” Hull also told Halifax “in great confi dence” that he expected some action on the part of the Japanese before long. [I]t would be a serious mistake for our country and other countries interested in the Pacifi c situation, to make plans of resistance without including the possibility that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element of surprise and . . . capture certain positions and posts before the peaceful countries interested in the Pacifi c would have time to confer and formulate plans to meet these new conditions. 2 2 Ibid., pp. 685–87, Hull November 29 memorandum of conversation.
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8.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Countdown Begins<br />
U.S.-Japanese Negotiations Broken Off<br />
U.S. “naval <strong>of</strong>fi cials in London had been informed by the<br />
Navy Department that negotiations between Japan <strong>and</strong> the<br />
United States had been broken <strong>of</strong>f <strong>and</strong> that an immediate<br />
movement by Japan was anticipated.” 1 When British Ambassador<br />
Lord Halifax heard this, he abruptly returned to Washington<br />
from Philadelphia where he had planned to weekend. Th e British<br />
government was “greatly excited” at the news. Halifax called on<br />
Undersecretary <strong>of</strong> State Welles that Friday evening, November<br />
28, to see if it was actually true. As far as Welles knew, the situation<br />
was exactly as it had been the night before: the Japanese<br />
ambassadors had submitted the U.S. government’s statement<br />
to their government: no reply had as yet been received, so that<br />
1Department <strong>of</strong> State, Foreign Relations <strong>of</strong> the United States: Diplomatic Papers,<br />
1941, vol. 2: Th e Far East (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing<br />
Offi ce, 1956), pp. 684–85, Welles November 28 memor<strong>and</strong>um <strong>of</strong> conversation<br />
with Halifax.<br />
179
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