Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Japanese Action Appears Imminent 177
negotiations.” Th e Japanese government had, in eff ect, thrown up
its hands, as Ambassador Kurusu had expected it would.
Tokyo added that a report on the American proposal would
be along in two or three days and then “the negotiations will be
defacto ruptured.” However, the two ambassadors were not
to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off .
Merely say . . . that you are awaiting instructions and that,
although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to
you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has
always made just claims and has borne great sacrifi ces for the
sake of peace in the Pacifi c. Say that we have always demonstrated
a long-suff ering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on
the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making
it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. . . . From now
on do the best you can. 35
Japanese Emergency to be Announced in
“Winds Code,” Coded Weather Forecast
In the midst of this diplomatic crisis, one of the most important
Japanese messages to be intercepted during this period was
read in Washington. It had been sent November 19 from Tokyo
in the J -19 (consular code), wasn’t deciphered and translated until
November 28. “In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our
diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications,”
a signal will be included “in the middle of the daily
Japanese language short wave news broadcast.” Th ree phrases followed.
Each appeared to be a weather forecast, but to each was
assigned a special meaning. In an emergency, Tokyo explained,
the appropriate phrase “will be repeated twice. When this is heard
35 Ibid., part 12, p. 195.