Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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Japanese Action Appears Imminent 175 of all activities against espionage comma and protection against sabotage of your equipment comma property and establishments period. 28 Again Short felt reassured that the sabotage alert he had initiated was appropriate. Navy Ordered to Transport Army Planes to Midway and Wake; Hawaiian Forces Weakened Th e day before the November 27 “war warning,” Kimmel was advised to prepare to send some planes, men, and provisions from Pearl Harbor to two outlying mid-Pacifi c islands: In order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use OPNAV [Chief of Naval Operations] has requested and Army has agreed to station twenty-fi ve Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake provided you consider this feasible and desirable. 29 Th e cabled orders that followed called on Kimmel to transport by aircraft carrier these Army planes, which were to support Navy operations, and to supply the islands with ground personnel, provisions, water, spare parts, tools, and ammunition. In light of WPL-46, stationing men and planes on Wake and Midway made sense. Wake was a couple of thousand miles west of Hawaii and closer to the Japanese mandated Marshall Islands. An outpost on Wake would extend the area over which reconnaissance could be conducted and would permit the United States to watch more closely what was going on in the Marshalls. At the same time, however, it meant depriving Hawaii of about 50 percent of the Army’s pursuit planes then on Oahu. And the 28 Ibid., part 14, p. 1330. 29 Ibid., part 17, p. 2479.

176 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy transfer operation itself would occupy for some time the fl eet’s aircraft carriers, its main striking defense against air attack. 30 Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., in command of the carrier Enterprise, left Pearl Harbor for Wake on November 28. With him went three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers. 31 On December 2 Kimmel responded at length to Stark’s cable. He described some of the diffi culties in having the Navy reinforce the outlying islands, and he made realistic suggestions for dealing with them. 32 On December 5 Admiral J.H. Newton left Hawaii aboard the carrier Lexington with another contingent of Army pursuit planes bound for Midway. Th ree heavy cruisers and fi ve destroyers accompanied the Lexington. En route, the patrol planes conducted reconnaissance, covering a much more extensive area than they could have from their Oahu base. 33 Also on December 5 Admiral Wilson Brown left Pearl Harbor with Task Force 3, aboard the Indianapolis with six old destroyers converted to sweepers, to conduct landing exercises on Johnston Island in the mid-Pacifi c. 34 Japanese Negotiations Defacto Ruptured On November 28, two days after the United States responded to the Japanese request for a modus vivendi, Tokyo sent her two Washington ambassadors a cable, which we deciphered and read that same day, commending them for their “superhuman eff orts.” However, the U.S. reply had been a “humiliating proposal.” Th e Imperial Government could “by no means use it as a basis for 30Ibid., part 6, p. 2520; see also Husband E. Kimmel, Admiral Kimmel’s Story (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1955), pp. 46–48. 31 Ibid., part 26, pp. 317–32, Halsey testimony at Hart Inquiry. 32 Ibid., part 17, pp. 2480–84 (Serial 0114W). 33 Ibid., part 26, p. 343, Newton testimony at Hart Inquiry. 34Ibid., part 26, pp. 141–46, Brown testimony at Hart Inquiry.

Japanese Action Appears Imminent 175<br />

<strong>of</strong> all activities against espionage comma <strong>and</strong> protection against<br />

sabotage <strong>of</strong> your equipment comma property <strong>and</strong> establishments<br />

period. 28<br />

Again Short felt reassured that the sabotage alert he had initiated<br />

was appropriate.<br />

Navy Ordered to Transport Army Planes to<br />

Midway <strong>and</strong> Wake; Hawaiian Forces Weakened<br />

Th e day before the November 27 “war warning,” Kimmel was<br />

advised to prepare to send some planes, men, <strong>and</strong> provisions from<br />

<strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> to two outlying mid-Pacifi c isl<strong>and</strong>s:<br />

In order to keep the planes <strong>of</strong> the Second Marine Aircraft<br />

Wing available for expeditionary use OPNAV [Chief <strong>of</strong><br />

Naval Operations] has requested <strong>and</strong> Army has agreed to station<br />

twenty-fi ve Army pursuit planes at Midway <strong>and</strong> a similar<br />

number at Wake provided you consider this feasible <strong>and</strong><br />

desirable. 29<br />

Th e cabled orders that followed called on Kimmel to transport by<br />

aircraft carrier these Army planes, which were to support Navy<br />

operations, <strong>and</strong> to supply the isl<strong>and</strong>s with ground personnel, provisions,<br />

water, spare parts, tools, <strong>and</strong> ammunition.<br />

In light <strong>of</strong> WPL-46, stationing men <strong>and</strong> planes on Wake<br />

<strong>and</strong> Midway made sense. Wake was a couple <strong>of</strong> thous<strong>and</strong> miles<br />

west <strong>of</strong> Hawaii <strong>and</strong> closer to the Japanese m<strong>and</strong>ated Marshall<br />

Isl<strong>and</strong>s. An outpost on Wake would extend the area over which<br />

reconnaissance could be conducted <strong>and</strong> would permit the United<br />

States to watch more closely what was going on in the Marshalls.<br />

At the same time, however, it meant depriving Hawaii <strong>of</strong> about<br />

50 percent <strong>of</strong> the Army’s pursuit planes then on Oahu. And the<br />

28 Ibid., part 14, p. 1330.<br />

29 Ibid., part 17, p. 2479.

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