Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Japanese Action Appears Imminent 173
Japanese force without warning. But they didn’t think we should
sit still either and allow the Japanese to proceed. Th ey decided
the only thing to do was to warn the Japanese that if the convoy
“reached a certain place, or a certain line, or a certain point, we
should have to fi ght.”
Th e president was inclined to send a personal telegram to the
emperor, as he had done with good results at the time of the
Panay incident, December 1937 24 But Stimson pointed out that
this would not be a suitable response in this case.
In the fi rst place, a letter to the Emperor of Japan could not be
couched in terms which contained an explicit warning. One
does not warn an Emperor. In the second place it would not
indicate to the people of the United States what the real nature
of the danger was.
Stimson then suggested a message from the president to the
people of the United States. He thought the best way to do that
would be to report to Congress on the danger and on what action
we would have to take if the danger materialized. Th e president
acceded to this suggestion. At fi rst he thought of incorporating
the terms of his letter to the emperor in the speech. But again
Stimson pointed out that a letter to an emperor could not be
publicized in that way. Th e president’s letter should be entirely
separate and confi dential. Also, his speech to Congress and to the
people should be expressed in more understandable terms. FDR
agreed and asked Hull, Knox, and Stimson to try to draft such
papers. 25
24 On December 12, 1938, Japanese planes had bombed a U.S. river gunboat,
the Panay near Nanjing, China. Th e ship was sunk, killing two and wounding
30. Th e U.S. demanded apologies, reparations, and guarantees against further
incidents. On December 14, the Japanese complied.
25 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, pp. 5435–36, account of the
War Cabinet meeting based on Stimson’s diary.