Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

172 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
He went to the White House early that morning, even before
FDR had gotten up. Analyzing the situation as he sat on his bed,
the president saw only three possible alternatives: “fi rst, to do nothing;
second, to make something in the nature of an ultimatum
again, stating a point beyond which we would fi ght; third, to fi ght
at once.” Stimson rejected the fi rst out of hand; he “did not think
anyone would do nothing in this situation.” Of the other two, he
would choose “to fi ght at once.” Stimson left, but he returned to
the White House again for the scheduled noon meeting with the
president, Hull, Knox, Stark, and Marshall.
FDR began the meeting by reading the possible destinations
of the Japanese convoy. Th en he pointed out one further possibility:
if the Japanese were to attack the Kra Isthmus, that could
lead to an attack on Rangoon, a short distance away, which would
enable the Japanese initially to block the Burma Road. Everyone
thought this was very likely.
Th e picture had changed radically since the last time they had
discussed sending an ultimatum to Japan. Th e Japanese expeditionary
force of some 25,000 troops at sea, destined to land somewhere,
had changed the situation. Everyone agreed that
if this expedition was allowed to get around the southern point
of Indochina and . . . land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok
or further west, it would be a terrifi c blow at all of the three
Powers, Britain at Singapore, the Netherlands, and ourselves in
the Philippines. . . . It was agreed that if the Japanese got into
the Isthmus of Kra [on the Malaysian peninsula], the British
would fi ght. It was also agreed that if the British fought, we
would have to fi ght. And it now seems clear that if this expedition
was allowed to round the southern point of Indochina,
this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot.
Th e consensus of the War Cabinet was that this should not be
allowed to happen, and the members discussed ways to prevent
it. Th ey did not believe the United States should strike at the