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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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170 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

comm<strong>and</strong>er-in-chief <strong>of</strong> the Pacifi c Fleet at <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>, was<br />

second. Information copies went to Admiral King, comm<strong>and</strong>erin-chief<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Atlantic Fleet <strong>and</strong> to the special naval observer in<br />

London.<br />

“Negotiations with Japan looking towards stabilization <strong>of</strong><br />

conditions in the Pacifi c have ceased,” Stark told his comm<strong>and</strong>ers<br />

in this “war warning.” An “aggressive move” on the part <strong>of</strong> the<br />

Japanese was “expected within the next few days . . . an amphibious<br />

expedition against either the Philippines Th ai or Kra peninsula<br />

or possibly Borneo. . . . Continental districts Guam Samoa<br />

directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.” Th e comm<strong>and</strong>ers<br />

should prepare to put WPL 46 (War Plan 46, Rainbow<br />

No. 5) into operation. 20<br />

Th e morning after this dispatch was received, Kimmel discussed<br />

its signifi cance with the senior Army <strong>and</strong> Navy <strong>of</strong>fi cers<br />

in Hawaii—Short; Admiral Bloch, comm<strong>and</strong>ant <strong>of</strong> the 14th<br />

Naval District who was in charge <strong>of</strong> naval shore establishments<br />

in Hawaii; the fl ag <strong>of</strong>fi cers <strong>of</strong> the fl eet then in port, as well as<br />

the members <strong>of</strong> Kimmel’s staff . After considerable study they<br />

“interpreted the warning to mean that war was imminent, <strong>and</strong><br />

that readiness to undertake active operations was expected.” To<br />

Kimmel being ready “to undertake active operations” meant “carrying<br />

out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.” And that meant preparing<br />

for <strong>of</strong>f ensive action in line with War Plan 46, then in operation,<br />

against the Japanese in the Marshall <strong>and</strong> Caroline Isl<strong>and</strong>s<br />

in the southwestern Pacifi c.<br />

Th is November 27 cable did not suggest the possibility <strong>of</strong> “a<br />

surprise aggressive move ‘in any direction” as had the dispatch sent<br />

three days earlier. 21 Th us the specifi c mention <strong>of</strong> “the Philippines,<br />

Th ai or Kra peninsula or possibly Borneo” as the intended destination<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Japanese expedition served only to reconfi rm the<br />

20 Ibid., part 14, p. 1406, CNO message #272337.<br />

21 Ibid., part 14, p. 1405, CNO dispatch #242005.

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