Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Japanese Action Appears Imminent 169
was not. Th e Hawaiian command had three diff erent alerts from
which to choose. Marshall was also familiar with the Army’s system
of alerts; again, Stimson was not.
In view of the Army’s responsibility and the instruction
not to alarm the public, a large percentage of whom were ethnic
Japanese, Short decided to go on a sabotage alert, clustering
the planes and storing the ammunition underground. Th is
was the most eff ective way to guard against subversive activities
in an area surrounded by potential enemies. On the assumption
that the cable had come from Marshall, Short wired Washington
that afternoon that he had “alerted to prevent sabotage” and had
established “liaison with Navy.” 18
Short’s response was received in Washington on November
28, at 5:57 am. 19 Under Army rules and regulations then in force,
if a junior offi cer, on receiving an order, reports measures taken
and his superior offi cer does not countermand them, the responsibility
for any error or mistake in judgment lies with the superior
offi cer. Short was the junior offi cer; Marshall his superior. As
instructed, Short reported the measures taken. If his action was
not considered appropriate, normal Army procedure would have
called for Marshall to order him to change his alert. No such
order was given. Th e planes and ammunition remained as they
were until the Japanese attack ten days later.
Admiral Stark’s “War Warning”
to Hart (Philippines) and Kimmel (Hawaii)
Also on November 27, CNO Stark sent his fl eet commanders
a “war warning,” reporting on the status of U.S.-Japan relations.
Admiral Hart, commander-in-chief of the Asiatic Fleet
in the Philippines, was the fi rst addressee; Admiral Kimmel,
18 Ibid., part 14, p. 1330.
19 Ibid., part 3, pp. 1027–28.