Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

168 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities
cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires
that Japan commit the fi rst overt act.” However, this should “not
be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might
jeopardize your defense.” Reconnaissance and other measures
necessary should be carried out with caution so as “not, repeat
not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent.” Short was asked
to “Report measures taken.” 16
Th e Army was responsible for protecting the fl eet when it
was in port. On receipt of this message (No. 472) on November
27, Short called a meeting of his staff . He had been instructed “to
undertake such reconnaissance . . . as you deem necessary.” At the
same time he was “not . . . to alarm civil population.”
Adequate reconnaissance to guard Hawaii against surprise
attack would have required 360-degree surveillance, 24 hours
a day. According to Admiral P.N.L. Bellinger, commander of
the Hawaiian Naval Base Air Force, and Commander Logan
C. Ramsey, his operations offi cer at the time of the attack, such
wide-ranging reconnaissance was not realistic, given the planes
and resources then available there. Most of their B-17s had been
sent to the Philippines. Only eight that could have been used
for long-range reconnaissance were available at the time of the
attack, and not all of those were in fl ying condition. Planes cannot
fl y continuously; they wear out and need servicing from time
to time. Crews need rest too; it is estimated that crews fl ying
long-range reconnaissance shouldn’t be asked to operate more
often than one in three days. 17 Th us long-range reconnaissance
could not have been maintained indefi nitely in Hawaii—its success
depended on timely warning of any potential threat.
Marshall was familiar with the shortage of planes in Hawaii.
But Stimson, who had drafted the November 27 warning message,
16 Ibid., part 14, p. 1328.
17 Ibid., part 8, p. 3454.