Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Japanese Action Appears Imminent 167
been prepared and sent by the Army chief of staff . It was most
unusual to send a message to a fi eld commander signed “Marshall,”
which had not actually been dispatched by him. 14 Marshall was
familiar with U.S. military outposts in a way that the secretary
of war was not. Also, the responsibility for strategic command
decisions fl owed from the commander-in-chief (the president)
to the chief of staff ; the chief of staff reported to the president.
Th e secretary of war’s duties lay outside this line of command;
they related primarily to personnel requirements and matters of
supply. However, Marshall was out of the city. So Stimson, Stark,
and Gerow went ahead on their own.
Stark and Gerow, quite naturally, were pressing for more time
for the military buildup before a Japanese strike. Stimson said
he would be “glad to have time” but not at the expense of backing
down. He “didn’t want it [time] at any cost of humility on
the part of the United States . . . which would show a weakness
on our part.” Before they fi nished drafting their message
to MacArthur, they called Hull to learn the latest on the situation
with the Japanese. 15 Th ey sent the message over Marshall’s
signature. Although directed primarily to MacArthur in the
Philippines, the Stimson-Stark-Gerow cable, with slight changes
and also signed “Marshall,” went to the Army’s commanding
generals in Hawaii and the Panama Canal Zone.
In Response to Army’s Warning, General Short
(Hawaii) Reports Sabotage Alert
Th e version of the Stimson-Stark-Gerow cable sent to Short
in Hawaii advised that “Negotiations with Japan appear to be
terminated to all practical purposes. . . . Japanese future action
14 Ibid., part 23, p. 1012.
15 Ibid., part 11, p. 5435, from Stimson’s November 27, 1941, diary.