Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

166 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Japanese troops convinced him that “there would be no Japanese
attack before the spring.” 11 Admiral Hart disagreed.
Reports were arriving in Washington regularly of the daily
reconnaissance overfl ights conducted from the Philippines to
keep track of the large Japanese convoy heading south from
Shanghai. Th us news of the Japanese expeditionary force came
in on November 27, apparently heading toward the Philippines,
Burma, the Burma Road, or the Dutch East Indies. And it was
expected that a concentration of Japanese troops would move over
into Th ailand and take a position there, from which an attack
could be launched on Singapore. Stimson suggested to FDR
that MacArthur in the Philippines be sent “a fi nal alert.” We had
already sent MacArthur a “quasi alert,” but Stimson thought he
should be given a further warning against a possible Japanese
attack. Th e president agreed. 12
Arrangements were being made to fl y B-l7s out to the
Philippines to reinforce our defenses there. Army Air Force
Commanding General Arnold called on Stimson on November
27 to present the orders for two of our biggest planes to move out
of San Francisco en route to Manila and fl y over—while photographing—the
Japanese mandated islands, where the Japanese
were known to be building military bases. Th ese big planes would
be able to fl y high enough to be out of reach of the Japanese pursuit
planes. 13
Secretary of Navy Knox and Stark called on Stimson on
November 27 to talk about the warning to be sent MacArthur
in the Philippines. General Leonard T. Gerow, Army chief of
war plans, was also present. A message to MacArthur calling for
action, such as Stimson was considering, would normally have
11 Francis Bowes Sayers, Glad Adventure (New York: Macmillan, 1957), p. 221.
12Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5435, from Stimson’s
November 27, 1941, diary.
13 Ibid., part 11, p. 5435, from Stimson’s November 27.