Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

164 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Th ey reminded FDR that if the current negotiations with the
Japanese ambassadors failed, “Japan may attack: the Burma Road;
Th ailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines;
the Russian Maritime Provinces.” Navy and Army reinforcements
were being rushed to the Philippines. From the U.S. viewpoint,
Marshall and Stark wrote, the “most essential thing now . . . is to
gain time.” Th ey were especially concerned for the safety of an
Army convoy then near Guam and a Marine Corps’ convoy just
leaving Shanghai. Th ey cautioned, however, that “so long as consistent
with national policy,” we should avoid precipitating any
confl ict.
Marshall and Stark also wrote it had been agreed, after consultation
with the British and Dutch military authorities in the
Far East,
that joint military counteraction against Japan should be
undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the
territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British
Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should
the Japanese move forces into Th ailand west of 1000 East or
south of 100 North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the
Loyalty Islands.
Japan should be warned that “advance beyond the lines indicated
may lead to war.” However, “prior to such warning, no joint
military opposition [should] be undertaken.” Moreover, Marshall
and Stark said, agreement with the British and Dutch should be
sought on issuing such a warning.
Th e fi rst thing in the morning of November 27, Secretary of
War Stimson phoned Secretary of State Hull to fi nd out “what
his fi nale had been with the Japanese.” Had Hull handed them the
three-month modus vivendi proposal, which had been approved a
couple of days before? Or had he put an end to the negotiations,
as he had said he might. Hull told Stimson he had broken the
whole matter off : “I have washed my hands of it and it is now in