Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Japanese Action Appears Imminent 163
weaken Japanese economic power.” 4 To accomplish this, our naval
forces were to
Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East
Area by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier
through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and
through raids on enemy sea communications and positions. 5
U.S. Pacifi c Fleet Operating Plan Rainbow No. 5 stipulated
that “In the event of an overt act of war by a foreign power
against the United States prior to the existence of a state of war,”
the senior commander, then Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor,
was “to take such action in the defense of his command and the
national interests as the situation may require, and report the
action taken to superior authority at once.” 6 Th e Plan called on
the fl eet to reconnoiter, sweep, patrol, and protect. However, the
primary objective prescribed for the Pacifi c Fleet under Rainbow
No. 5 was to prepare to raid, capture, and destroy the bases in the
Japanese-controlled Marshall and Caroline islands. Th e assignments
of each task force were set forth in detail in the plan. 7
Stark and Marshall Again Ask for
Time to Build U.S. Defenses
Before Marshall left for maneuvers on November 26, he and
Chief of Naval Operations Stark prepared a joint memorandum
to the president on the “Far Eastern Situation.” 8 Dated November
27, their memorandum expressed concern that they might not
have enough time to build up their forces before a Japanese strike.
4 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 15, pp. 1491–92.
5 Ibid., p. 1511.
6 Ibid., part 17, p. 2585.
7 Ibid., part 17, pp. 2568–600.
8 Ibid., part 14, p. 1083.