Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Modus Vivendi—Yes? No! 159
Japanese Cabinet Expected to Decide
Soon Between Peace and War
Also on November 26, we deciphered a “Strictly Secret” cable
sent the day before, via “Purple,” from Hanoi in Indochina, to
Tokyo. 52 Japanese diplomatic offi cials in Indochina had heard
from military sources that the United States was expected to
present its reply to the Japanese envoys’ modus vivendi proposal
that very day, November 25. “If this is true,” Hanoi cabled, if the
U.S. did answer Japan’s request for a modus vivendi as expected,
the United States’ response would bring matters to a head. In that
event, Hanoi assumed that the Japanese Cabinet would be making
“a decision between peace and war within the next day or
two.”
“[I]f the U.S.-Japanese negotiations are brought to a successful
termination,” Hanoi continued, they had plans for launching
various enterprises. “Should, however, the negotiations [in
Washington] not end in a success,” as the military sources had
implied would be the case, “since practically all preparations for
the campaign have been completed, our forces shall be able to
move within the day.”
Hanoi was disturbed that representatives of Britain, Australia,
the Netherlands, and even China had been meeting with U.S.
offi cials in Washington and must be aware of the status of the
U.S.-Japanese negotiations. Japan’s offi cials in Hanoi knew from
Tokyo’s circular message #2353 (which we had not intercepted
and translated before we read this Hanoi cable to Tokyo) that the
situation was “becoming exceedingly critical.”
Our offi cials in Washington who were privy to MAGIC
learned from this telegram that the Japanese cabinet would soon
make a decision between peace and war. If the Japanese envoys in
Washington succeeded in obtaining an acceptable modus vivendi,
52 Ibid., part 12, pp. 174–75.