Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Modus Vivendi—Yes? No! 157
c. We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy
powers, even though they might have connections with the
new Chinese government, should it become necessary.
Th e Japanese were under no illusion as to the problems involved
in fi ghting an expanded war. Th eir forces were widely extended
and their resources severely strained. Th ey wanted to “avoid,
insofar as possible, exhausting our veteran troops.” However, they
were prepared to “cope with a world war on a long-time scale.” If
their “reserves for total war and . . . future military strength wane,”
they would “reinforce them from the whole Far Eastern area. Th is
has become the whole fundamental policy of the Empire.”
To carry out these foreign policy objectives, the Japanese
would
encourage the activities of important Chinese in their eff orts in
the occupied territories insofar as is possible. Japan and China,
working in cooperation, will take over military bases. Th us,
operating wherever possible, we will realize peace throughout
the entire Far East.
However, because of the U.S. embargo on exports to Japan,
resources were a primary concern; “great importance [was placed]
upon the acquisition of materials (especially from unoccupied
areas).” Th e entire Japanese cabinet “concurred.” 50
Th e military and administration offi cials in Washington who
read this intercept could have had little doubt as to the seriousness
of the consequences if the negotiations with the Japanese
ambassadors failed.
50 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, pp. 126–27.