Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Modus Vivendi—Yes? No! 155
way of exploration.” With that the two Japanese ambassadors
were dismissed. 47
British Notified of MODUS VIVENDI Rejection
Almost immediately after delivering to the Japanese ambassadors
the U.S. note with its unacceptable ten points, Hull cabled
Ambassador Grew in Japan and Ambassador C.E. Gauss in
China. 48 Th at evening Hull telephoned British Ambassador Lord
Halifax “to inform him of the nature of the document which he
had handed the Japanese envoys.” Neither our War nor Navy
department was advised.
Th e following morning, Lord Halifax called on Undersecretary
of State Welles to ask why the proposed modus vivendi had been
overthrown and a virtual “ultimatum” issued. “[O]ne of the reasons
for the determination reached,” Welles replied, “was the
half-hearted support given by the British Government to the
earlier proposal.” Halifax “could not understand this in as much
as he had communicated to Hull the full support of the British
Government.” Welles responded that Churchill’s expressed concern
with Chiang’s “thin diet” “could hardly be regarded as ‘full
support’.” Halifax admitted that he “had been surprised by the
vigor of the Chinese objections.” He had thought “that the course
proposed by Hull gave positive assurances to the Chinese government
that the Burma Road would in fact be kept open if the
modus vivendi agreement with Japan could be consummated.” He
believed that the Chinese government’s attitude
was based partly on faulty information and partly on the
almost hysterical reaction because of the fear that any kind
47Department of State, Japan: 1931–1941, pp. 764–66. State Department
memorandum of November 26, 1941 meeting.
48Department of State, Th e Far East, p. 666, Telegram #783 to Grew; and p.
666n. Telegram #274 to Gauss.