Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

154 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
organization, citing the case of the award against Japan by the
Hague tribunal in the Perpetual Leases matter.
Kurusu did not believe his government could agree to paragraph
(3) calling on Japan to withdraw all military, naval, air,
and police forces from both China and Indochina, or paragraph
(4) asking her to refrain from supporting—militarily, politically,
economically—any government or regime in China other than
Chiang’s national government. Kurusu did not think the United
States should expect Japan to “take off its hat to Chiang Kai-shek
and propose to recognize him. . . . He said that if this was the idea
of the American Government he did not see how any agreement
was possible.”
Hull asked if this couldn’t be “worked out.” Kurusu responded
“that when they [the Japanese ambassadors] reported our answer
to their Government it would be likely to throw up its hands.”
However, he said, “this was a tentative proposal without commitment.”
Perhaps they should “not refer it to their Government
before discussing its contents further informally here.” Hull said
they might want to study the document carefully, but he explained
that “our proposal was as far as we could go at this time.” With
specifi c reference to the oil question, Hull said “public feeling
[in the United States] was so acute . . . that he might almost be
lynched if he permitted oil to go freely to Japan.”
Kurusu “felt that our response to their proposal could be
interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end.” He wanted to
know if we weren’t interested in a modus vivendi. “Th e Secretary
replied that we had explored that. Mr. Kurusu asked whether it
was because the other powers would not agree.” Th e Japanese
must have been aware of the plans we had been making to cooperate
with the British and Dutch in the southwest Pacifi c. Th e
secretary [Hull] replied simply that “he had done his best in the