Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...
Modus Vivendi—Yes? No! 151 by Chiang’s campaign of cables, had tipped the scales against Japan. Without consulting his other advisers, Roosevelt authorized Hull to give the Japanese a ten-point note based on White’s suggestions. Neither War nor Navy department was notifi ed of this decision. Both Roosevelt and Hull realized their note would be unacceptable to the Japanese. Chiang’s anti-Japanese campaign, orchestrated largely by three communist sympathizers—White, Lattimore, and Currie, with Edward C. Carter standing in the wings ready to help if need be—had paid off . 44 U. S. Note Delivered to Japanese Ambassadors Th at afternoon, November 26, Hull summoned the two Japanese ambassadors to his offi ce and handed them the statement FDR had approved. Section I set forth a number of diplomatic platitudes. Th e governments of the United States and Japan were 44 Th e Communist affi liations of these several advisers are on the record. Th e evidence off ered by Whittaker Chambers and Elizabeth Bentley that White engaged in Soviet espionage was considered “conclusive” by Attorney General Brownell, “uncontradictable” by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, and “incontrovertible” by President Eisenhower (Rees, Harry Dexter White, p. 424). After Lattimore fi nished testifying during the investigation of the Institute for Pacifi c Relations conducted by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, the Subcommittee reported that Lattimore had been “from some time in the middle 1930s a conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy” (Francis X. Gannon, Biographical Dictionary of the Left, Belmont, Mass.: Western Islands, 1969, consolidated vol. 1., p. 416). On November 8, 1945, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover informed President Truman that Currie was “one of many persons within the federal government who ‘have been furnishing data and information to persons outside the Federal Government, who are in turn transmitting this information to agents of the Soviet Government’ ” (Ibid., p. 299). When testifying before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on July 1, 1948, former Soviet espionage agent Elizabeth Bentley accused Currie of having “furnished United States government secrets to a Soviet spy ring” (Ibid., p. 299).
152 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy both “solicitous for the peace of the Pacifi c.” Th en several general principles were presented on which their mutual relations should be governed—principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, noninterference in the internal aff airs of other nations, equality of commercial opportunity, international cooperation, etc. Section II listed “Steps To Be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan.” Ten points followed. 45 45 Department of State, Japan: 1931-1941, pp. 768–70. Th e Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows: 1. Th e Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Th ailand and the United States. 2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands [sic] and Th ai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its infl uence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina. 3. Th e Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina. 4. Th e Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking. 5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of
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152 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />
both “solicitous for the peace <strong>of</strong> the Pacifi c.” Th en several general<br />
principles were presented on which their mutual relations should<br />
be governed—principles <strong>of</strong> territorial integrity, sovereignty, noninterference<br />
in the internal aff airs <strong>of</strong> other nations, equality <strong>of</strong><br />
commercial opportunity, international cooperation, etc. Section<br />
II listed “Steps To Be Taken by the Government <strong>of</strong> the United<br />
States <strong>and</strong> by the Government <strong>of</strong> Japan.” Ten points followed. 45<br />
45 Department <strong>of</strong> State, Japan: 1931-1941, pp. 768–70.<br />
Th e Government <strong>of</strong> the United States <strong>and</strong> the Government <strong>of</strong> Japan propose<br />
to take steps as follows:<br />
1. Th e Government <strong>of</strong> the United States <strong>and</strong> the Government <strong>of</strong> Japan<br />
will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among<br />
the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s, the Soviet Union,<br />
Th ail<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> the United States.<br />
2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American,<br />
British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s [sic] <strong>and</strong> Th ai<br />
Governments an agreement whereunder each <strong>of</strong> the Governments<br />
would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity <strong>of</strong> French<br />
Indochina <strong>and</strong>, in the event that there should develop a threat to the<br />
territorial integrity <strong>of</strong> Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation<br />
with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary<br />
<strong>and</strong> advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement<br />
would provide also that each <strong>of</strong> the Governments party to the agreement<br />
would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or<br />
economic relations with Indochina <strong>and</strong> would use its infl uence to<br />
obtain for each <strong>of</strong> the signatories equality <strong>of</strong> treatment in trade <strong>and</strong><br />
commerce with French Indochina.<br />
3. Th e Government <strong>of</strong> Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air <strong>and</strong><br />
police forces from China <strong>and</strong> from Indochina.<br />
4. Th e Government <strong>of</strong> the United States <strong>and</strong> the Government <strong>of</strong> Japan<br />
will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government<br />
or regime in China other than the National Government <strong>of</strong><br />
the Republic <strong>of</strong> China with capital temporarily at Chungking.<br />
5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China,<br />
including rights <strong>and</strong> interests in <strong>and</strong> with regard to international<br />
settlements <strong>and</strong> concessions, <strong>and</strong> rights under the Boxer Protocol <strong>of</strong>
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