Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Modus Vivendi—Yes? No! 149
given. So Hull was asked to prepare such a statement to be
submitted to Japan. 37
When Stimson returned to his offi ce from this meeting, he
learned from Army Intelligence, G-2, that fi ve Japanese divisions
were headed southward from Shantung and Shansi to Shanghai.
Th e ships had been sighted south of Formosa. He immediately
phoned Hull and sent him a copy of the G-2 message. He also
sent a copy to the president. 38
U.S. Proposed MODUS VIVENDI Scuttled
At 6:00 a.m. the next day, a Triple Priority cable, addressed to
FDR from “the former Naval person,” Winston Churchill, was
received in Washington. Churchill acknowledged receipt of the
U.S. proposed modus vivendi. “Of course, it is for you to handle
this business,” Churchill cabled, “and we certainly do not want an
additional war. Th ere is only one point that disquiets us. What
about Chiang Kai Shek? Is he not having a very thin diet? . . . If
they collapse, our joint dangers would enormously increase.” 39
Early that morning, T.V. Soong, Chiang’s brother-in-law and
emissary in Washington, called on Harry Dexter White. Soong
pleaded with White to use his infl uence with Morgenthau to try
to have the proposed U.S. modus vivendi killed. White approached
Morgenthau and persuaded him to call on the president.
Morgenthau walked through the underground passageway linking
the Treasury building to the White House to see Roosevelt.
After Morgenthau described the Chinese ambassador’s and
37Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5433, excerpt from Stimson’s
diary, November 25, 1941.
38Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, pp. 5433–34, from Stimson
diary, as quoted in JCC hearings.
39Department of State, Th e Far East, p. 665.