Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

148 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
them “detailed instructions for the destruction of code machines”
to be carried out “in the event of an emergency.” 35 Here was clear
evidence that Japan was contemplating more hostile action in the
near future.
At noon on November 25, FDR’s War Cabinet met at the
White House. “[I]nstead of bringing up the Victory Parade,” that
is the plan “for the actual winning of a war not yet declared,”
as Stimson had expected, Roosevelt raised another subject. He
announced, Stimson recalled, “that we were likely to be attacked
perhaps (as soon as) next Monday [December 1].” Th e Japanese
were undoubtedly planning an “expedition to the South,” which
would be likely to interfere with “our interests in the Philippines
and cutting into our vital supplies of rubber from Malaysia.” Hull
“laid out his general broad propositions on which the thing [our
response to Japan’s proposed modus vivendi] should be rested—
the freedom of the seas and the fact that Japan was in alliance
with Hitler and was carrying out his policy of world aggression.”
FDR reminded the group that the Japanese were “notorious
for making an attack without warning.” Th e question before the
War Cabinet was “how we should maneuver them into the position
of fi ring the fi rst shot without allowing too much danger to
ourselves.” Stimson confi ded to his diary that this was indeed “a
diffi cult proposition.” Th e possibility of issuing Japan an ultimatum
was also raised at this meeting. Stimson pointed out that the
president
had already taken the fi rst steps towards an ultimatum in notifying
Japan way back last summer [August 17] 36 that if she crossed
the border into Th ailand, she was violating our safety. . . . [H]e
had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow [sic; allow?] any
such expedition was a violation of a warning we had already
35 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 137.
36 Department of State, Japan: 1941, p. 558.