Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Modus Vivendi—Yes? No! 147
Japanese threat is to attack the Burma Road through Indochina
and appealing loudly for aid.” Hull pointed out that
practically the fi rst thing this present proposal of mine and
the president does is to require the Japanese troops to be
taken out of Indochina and thereby to protect the Burma
Road. . . . [O]ur proposal would relieve the menace of Japan
in Indochina to the whole South Pacifi c area.
Hull continued,
Of course, we can cancel this proposal, but it must be with the
understanding that we are not to be charged with failure to send
our fl eet into the area near Indochina and into Japanese waters,
if by any chance Japan makes a military drive southward. 34
It would seem that either Hu Shih had completely misunderstood
the provisions of the proposed modus vivendi or Chiang
had. Perhaps these provisions had been misrepresented to China.
As Hull explained to Hu Shih, the draft Hull had outlined previously
would have required Japan to withdraw all military and
police forces from China proper and from Indochina. Japan would
also have had to agree to support no other government or regime
in China except Chiang’s, then headquartered at Chungking. If
Japan acceded to these provisions, it would constitute a great victory
for Chiang’s government.
Japanese Attack Appears Imminent;
Stimson: Can They Be Maneuvered
Into “Firing the First Shot?”
On November 25, Navy intelligence deciphered and translated
a Japanese J-19 circular message (#2330) sent ten days
before from Tokyo to all Japan’s representatives abroad. It gave
34 Ibid., pp. 653–54.