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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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xvi <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

code, <strong>and</strong> Dewey did not want to run the chance <strong>of</strong> alerting the<br />

Japanese to change their code <strong>and</strong> thus destroy an extremely valuable<br />

source <strong>of</strong> U.S. intelligence.<br />

It would have been a real scoop to report this news on the<br />

pages <strong>of</strong> Life, my employer at the time. But should I? I lost no<br />

time in sending a memor<strong>and</strong>um to Henry Luce, publisher <strong>of</strong> Life,<br />

about the colonel’s disclosure. He reacted as Dewey had. He told<br />

me to fi le the information away; it would be useful after the war.<br />

Right after the Japanese surrender on August 14, 1945, Luce<br />

sent me to upstate New York to interview Dewey. After an allnight<br />

train ride, I caught up with him at the Elmira Reformatory,<br />

where he was on an inspection tour. He asked me to join him<br />

in his limousine for the ride to Geneva, his next stop. We drove<br />

along scenic Lake Seneca. But I didn’t glance at the beautiful<br />

Finger Lake scenery; I was enthralled with Dewey’s story.<br />

In September 1944, a tall, dark, <strong>and</strong> h<strong>and</strong>some colonel, Carter<br />

Clarke, had delivered to Dewey a letter from Army Chief <strong>of</strong> Staff<br />

General Marshall. Th e letter told Dewey that we had cracked the<br />

Japanese diplomatic code. We were still deriving enormous military<br />

advantages from reading <strong>and</strong> decrypting coded intercepts.<br />

American lives would be lost if the Japanese changed their code.<br />

Th erefore, it was <strong>of</strong> the utmost importance that no word about<br />

that should leak out that might reach the Japanese. As a result,<br />

Dewey was persuaded to keep the issues <strong>of</strong> <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> <strong>and</strong> the<br />

Japanese code out <strong>of</strong> the campaign. Dewey told me I could use<br />

the story <strong>of</strong> his “gagging,” but he warned that I must not reveal<br />

my source. My article appeared in the September 24, 1945, issue<br />

<strong>of</strong> Life.<br />

Luce then gave me the assignment <strong>of</strong> attending the hearings<br />

<strong>of</strong> the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation <strong>of</strong><br />

the <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, just then preparing to get under way.<br />

Th e Congressional hearings ran from November 15, 1945, until<br />

May 31, 1946, when the last witness appeared. Th ose hearings

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