Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Modus Vivendi—Yes? No! 145
their plans, so that even if in the future America would come to
our rescue the situation would be already hopeless. 30
Another cable was sent that same day by one of Chiang’s
advisers, Owen Lattimore, to Lauchlin Currie, then an administrative
assistant to President Roosevelt and a friend of Lattimore’s.
Currie had helped Lattimore obtain the appointment as Chiang’s
U.S. political adviser. 31 Lattimore cabled that he had “never seen
him [Chiang Kai-shek] really agitated before. Loosening of economic
pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan’s
military advantage in China.” According to Lattimore, Chiang
believed that
A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces
in China would dismay the Chinese. Any Modus Vivendi now
arrived at with China [sic; Japan?] would be disastrous to
Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the
Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige.
. . . It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing
aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this
hour. Th e Generalissimo [Chiang] has deep confi dence in the
President’s fi delity to his consistent policy but I must warn you
that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the
situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is
undermined by reports of Japan’s escaping military defeat by
diplomatic victory. 32
30Department of State, Th e Far East, pp. 660–61, telegram from Chiang Kaishek
to Dr. T.V. Soong, November 25, 1941.
31U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate
the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal
Security Laws, Institute of Pacifi c Relations, 82nd Congress, 2nd session, part
9, pp. 3209–12.
32Department of State, Th e Far East, p. 652; Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor
Attack, part 14, p. 1160.