Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Modus Vivendi—Yes? No! 143
for these concessions, the United States would agree to relax
her trade restrictions for three months. Th e export of petroleum
to Japan would be permitted “upon a monthly basis for civilian
needs” only. Th e United States also would try to induce the
Australian, British and Dutch governments to relax their trade
restrictions. .23
In a November 24 telegram to Churchill, Roosevelt summarized
this three-month modus vivendi:
Th is seems to me a fair proposition for the Japanese but its
acceptance or rejection is really a matter of internal Japanese
politics. I am not very hopeful and we must all be prepared for
real trouble, possibly soon. 24
Stimson and Knox met in Hull’s offi ce on November 25, where
they discussed the proposal at some length. Stimson thought it
“adequately safeguarded all our interests,” but he didn’t think the
Japanese would accept it because it was “so drastic.” 25
British Ambassador Lord Halifax called on Hull later that
same morning and relayed Britain’s approval of the U.S. decision
to present the Japanese with a counterproposal. Th e British, he
said, had “complete confi dence in Mr. Hull’s handling of these
negotiations.” Th ey believed “the Japanese will try to force a hurried
decision by magnifying the dangers of delay” and urged
that to prevent misrepresentation by Japan it will have to be
made public that any interim agreement is purely provisional
and is only concluded to facilitate negotiation of an ultimate
23Department of State, Th e Far East, p. 644.
24Ibid., p. 649.
25Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 11, p. 5433. Excerpt reprinted
from Stimson’s November 25 diary.