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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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142 <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong>: <strong>The</strong> <strong>Seeds</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Fruits</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Infamy</strong><br />

<strong>The</strong> U. S. Proposes 3 -Month MODUS VIVENDI<br />

Th e U.S. counterproposal to the Japanese modus vivendi went<br />

through several drafts. Th e one fi nally approved—by both the<br />

War <strong>and</strong> Navy departments <strong>and</strong> then later, at a White House<br />

meeting, by FDR’s so-called “War Cabinet”—provided for a<br />

three-month respite.<br />

Th e United States was still, <strong>of</strong> course, <strong>of</strong>fi cially neutral <strong>and</strong><br />

nominally at peace. However, a War Cabinet had been set up<br />

as an informal body to coordinate the activities <strong>of</strong> the civil <strong>and</strong><br />

military branches <strong>of</strong> the executive department. Th is War Cabinet<br />

consisted <strong>of</strong> the president; the secretaries <strong>of</strong> State (Hull), War<br />

(Stimson), <strong>and</strong> Navy (Knox); the Army chief <strong>of</strong> staff (Marshall),<br />

chief <strong>of</strong> naval operations (Stark), <strong>and</strong> occasionally the comm<strong>and</strong>ing<br />

general <strong>of</strong> the Air Force (Arnold).<br />

It was a sort <strong>of</strong> clearing house for information, a gathering<br />

place for discussion <strong>of</strong> policies, so that each <strong>of</strong> the independent<br />

actors in the scene would know what was going on <strong>and</strong> would<br />

have information to guide him in making his own decisions<br />

that were more or less independent, but at the same time also<br />

somewhat dependent on the action <strong>of</strong> other members <strong>of</strong> the<br />

group. 22<br />

Th e U.S. proposal called on Japan to withdraw her troops<br />

from French Indochina <strong>and</strong> to make no further advances in Asia<br />

or the Pacifi c. Th ese provisions would accomplish the administration’s<br />

goals <strong>of</strong> restraining Japan <strong>and</strong> protecting China. In return<br />

22 Joint Committee, <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, part 39, p. 135. Quotation from<br />

Army <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Board Report. See also U.S. Congress, Report <strong>of</strong> the Joint<br />

Committee on the Investigation <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Attack, Congress <strong>of</strong> the United<br />

States, Pursuant to S. Con. Res. 27, A Concurrent Resolution Authorizing an<br />

Investigation <strong>of</strong> the Attack on <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> on December 7, 1941, <strong>and</strong> Events<br />

<strong>and</strong> Circumstances Relating Th ereto <strong>and</strong> Additional Views <strong>of</strong> Mr. Keefe Together<br />

with Minority Views <strong>of</strong> Mr. Ferguson <strong>and</strong> Mr. Brewster, 79th Cong., 2nd sess.<br />

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1946), p. 513.

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