Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Modus Vivendi—Yes? No! 141
of establishing an anticommunist “New Order” in Asia. Japan,
Manchukuo, and China were to cooperate “to secure international
justice, to perfect the joint defense against Communism,
and to create a new culture and realize a close economic cohesion
throughout east Asia.” 19
In the evening of November 24 Chinese ambassador Hu Shih
called on Stanley K. Hornbeck, State Department adviser on
political relations, to register his objections to the modus vivendi
the United States was considering. Th e ambassador said “he realized
that it would be very helpful to keep the Japanese in suspense
for another three months, but he doubted whether that could be
achieved.” However, he assured Hornbeck “that he would try to
cause his Government to see the problem in the light in which
the American Government sees it.” 20
Th e Dutch minister had told Hull on November 22 that his
government supported the U.S. proposal. However, the Dutch
government had contacted him again to express reservations, as
the Chinese ambassador had, to the number of Japanese troops
that might be left in Indochina. Th e minister also called on
Hornbeck that evening to relay to him his government’s second
thoughts. 21
19 U.S. House Committee on Foreign Aff airs. Events Leading up to World War
II: Chronological History of Certain Major International Events Leading up to
and During World War II with the Ostensible Reasons Advanced for their Occurrence,
1931–1944, 78th Cong., 2nd sess., 1944, p. 169. November 3, 1938 entry
quotes from Prime Minister Prince Konoye’s November 3, 1938 radio speech
announcing Japan’s intention of creating a “new order” in east Asia. For entire
speech, see Department of State, Japan: 1931–1941, pp. 478–81.
20 Department of State, Th e Far East, p. 650–51, memorandum of conversations
of State Department’s adviser on political relations, Stanley K. Hornbeck.
21 Ibid.