Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

140 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
reasoned that she [ Japan] would not commit the strategic
blunder of delivering a surprise attack on United States territory,
the one course that irrevocably would unite the American
people in war against Japan. 16
So the eff ect of Stark’s message was to turn the attention of
Kimmel and his advisers toward the Far East.
Objections Raised to U. S.
Proposed MODUS VIVENDI
Another November 24 meeting concerning the U.S. proposed
modus vivendi took place in the offi ce of Treasury Secretary
Morgenthau. Also present were Harry Dexter White, an assistant
secretary, and Russian embassy counselor (later ambassador)
Andrei Gromyko. White protested against “a Far Eastern
Munich.” He drafted a letter to Roosevelt for Morgenthau’s signature
stating that to sell China
to her enemies for thirty blood stained pieces of gold will not
only weaken our national policy in Europe as well as in the Far
East, but will dim the luster of American world leadership in
the great democratic fi ght against fascism. 17
Morgenthau didn’t send that letter. He didn’t have to; he realized
“the president needed no prodding to stand for precisely the
policy which the Secretary then and later considered essential. He
had, in a sense, deemed it essential ever since the fall of 1938.” 18 It
was in November 1938 that Japan had announced her intention
16 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 39 (Report), p. 314, analysis here
as culled from testimony during the JCC hearings and presented in its fi nal
report.
17 David Rees, Harry Dexter White: A Study in Paradox (New York: Coward,
McCann & Geoghegan, 1973), p. 125.
18 John Morton Blum, From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of Urgency, 1938–
1941 (Boston: Houghton Miffl in, 1965), p. 389.