Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Modus Vivendi—Yes? No! 139
were identifi ed by a six-digit number indicating the time and
date fi led in Greenwich, England. Th is system eliminated confusion
that might arise when sending and receiving messages to
and from diff erent time zones.)
In his cable Stark advised his fi eld commanders:
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very
doubtful. Th is situation coupled with statements of Japanese
Government and movements their naval and military forces
indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement
in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a
possibility.… Guam will be informed separately. 15
Th e commanders were asked “to inform senior Army offi cers
their areas.”
Following instructions, Admiral Kimmel consulted with
General Short in Hawaii. Kimmel and his advisers did not dispute
Japan’s “capability” for delivering “a long-range surprise
bombing attack” on Pearl Harbor. Nor did they rule out the possibility
that Japan “might attack without a declaration of war.”
Th e Philippines and Guam seemed the only U.S. possessions
imminently threatened by Japan. Th e Philippines were on the
fl ank of the most direct route from Japan to French Indochina,
the Malay Peninsula, and the Dutch East Indies. And Guam,
the site of a U.S. naval station, lay in the midst of the Japanesemandated,
formerly German-owned, islands—the Marianas,
Carolines, and Marshalls. (After World War I, Japan, then an
ally of Great Britain and the United States, had been given these
islands to administer under a League of Nations mandate, and
we had known for some time that Japan was constructing naval
and air bases on them.) Th us, Kimmel and his advisers did not
consider it likely that Hawaii would be the target of such “a surprise
aggressive movement in any direction.” Th ey
15 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, p. 1405.