Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

138 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
thing, he believed that permitting the Japanese to retain soldiers
in Indochina would pose a threat to China’s supply line, the
recently reopened Burma Road.
Hull realized the urgency of the situation. He pointed out
to the four diplomats the importance of reaching a temporary
agreement with the Japanese to assure a few more months of
peace. He said he was
striving to reach this proposed temporary agreement primarily
because the heads of our Army and Navy often emphasize
to [him] that time is the all-important question for them, and
that it is necessary to be more fully prepared to deal eff ectively
with the situation in the Pacifi c area in case of an outbreak by
Japan.
Hull also
emphasized the point that, even if we agree that the chances of
such an outbreak are not great, it must be admitted that there
are real possibilities that such an outbreak may soon occur—
any day after this week—unless a temporary arrangement is
eff ected. (italics added) 14
Information then available in the Navy Department clearly
indicated that the Japanese were planning some decisive action
for the very near future. In the afternoon of November 24, Chief
of Naval Operations Stark authorized a circular message to his
fl eet commanders on the rim of the Pacifi c—in the Philippines
(Hart), at Pearl Harbor (Kimmel), and to the commandants of
the several naval districts, Panama (15th), San Diego (11th), San
Francisco (12th), and Seattle (13th)—with copies for information
only to SPENAVO (Special Naval Observer/London) and the
commander of the Atlantic Fleet (King). (All Navy messages
14Department of State, Th e Far East, pp. 646–47, Hull’s memorandum of
conversation.