Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Modus Vivendi—Yes? No! 137
have serious repercussions, but also that their government was
not taking them into full confi dence.
On November 22, Japan made another concession, off ering
to move her troops from the south of Indochina to the north.
Kurusu told Hull it had taken
a great deal of persuasion to induce the army to abandon a
position once taken, but that both he and the Ambassador had
been pleasantly surprised when the Japanese army acceded to
their suggestion in regard to off ering to withdraw the Japanese
troops from southern Indochina.
Kurusu considered this “an encouraging sign.” 12
On November 24, two days after U.S. intelligence experts
decoded Tokyo cable #812 extending the Japanese deadline to
November 29, the two ambassadors received a follow-up cable
from Tokyo: “Th e time limit set in my message #812 is in Tokyo
time.” 13 Th at was 14 hours earlier than Washington time. Th us
we were alerted that the timing of the deadline was crucial. Th is
cable was decoded by our cryptoanalysts in Washington the same
day it was sent.
More Discussions Among Friends
of the U.S. on U.S. Response to Japan
Also on November 24, Hull met once more with the
Australian, British, Chinese, and Dutch diplomats. Th e Dutch
minister said his government “would support the [U.S.] modus
vivendi proposal.” However, Chinese Ambassador Hu Shih
objected to several of its provisions that aff ected China. For one
12Department of State, Japan, 1931–1941, p. 758. State Department memorandum
of Hull’s November 22 conversation with the Japanese ambassadors.
13Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 173. Tokyo message #823
to Washington.