Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

136 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
words, he “always is when any question concerning China arises
not entirely to his way of thinking.” 10
Japanese Deadline Extended to
November 29, After Which “Things Are
Automatically Going to Happen.”
Th e Japanese ambassadors had been told on November 5, that
they must conclude their deliberations by November 25. Th en
on November 22, Tokyo cabled them, extending the deadline to
November 29, but urged them to continue their eff orts: “Stick to
your fi xed policy and do your very best. Spare no eff orts and try
to bring about the solution we desire.” It is “awfully hard for us to
consider changing the date,” Tokyo told the two ambassadors.
Th ere are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted
to settle the Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if
within the next three or four days you can fi nish your conversations
with the Americans; if the signing can be completed
by the 29th (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the
pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding
with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if
everything can be fi nished, we have decided to wait until that
date.
But, the Japanese government added, “Th is time we mean it, that
the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are
automatically going to happen.” (Italics added.) 11
Th e Japanese ambassadors were being giving a little more
time. It was obvious that the failure of the negotiations would
10 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers,
1941, vol. 4: Th e Far East, 7 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Offi ce, 1956), p. 640, Hull memorandum of November 22, 1941.
11 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, p. 165. Tokyo cable #812 to
Japanese Ambassador in Washington.