Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Modus Vivendi—Yes? No! 135
4. U.S. to introduce Japs to Chinese to talk things over but U.S.
to take no part in their conversations.
Later on Pacifi c agreements. 9
Apparently FDR was then willing to enter into an agreement
with Japan to help relieve the economic pressures on her for six
months. He would permit Japan to obtain some oil and rice. He
would not insist that Japan pull out of Indochina completely.
He was concerned about the Japanese-German pact. However,
in item 4 FDR ignored Japan’s request that the United States
“refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to
. . . the restoration of general peace” in China. In other words,
he did not acknowledge Japan’s request that the United States
discontinue helping Chiang’s forces. To FDR, aid to China was
important; by helping China we were hurting Japan, preventing
her from attacking the Russian Communists in the far east,
and that helped our allies, England and Russia, in their struggle
against Germany in Europe.
Before responding to the Japanese proposal, Hull met on
November 22 with the British and Australian ambassadors and
the Dutch minister to determine the reactions of their respective
governments. Th e Chinese ambassador, also invited, was
late in arriving. Hull suggested, and the others seemed to agree,
that it would be better to submit a substitute proposal than to
make “a specifi c reply to the Japanese proposal, section for section.”
He outlined his alternative modus vivendi, the major purposes
of which were to contain Japan and to protect China. Th e
ambassadors all “seemed to be well pleased . . . except the Chinese
Ambassador, who was somewhat disturbed.” But then, in Hull’s
9 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 14, pp. 1108–09, undated, probably
shortly after November 20, 1941; Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill,
1939–1941: Th e Partnership Th at Saved the West (New York: W.W. Norton,
1976), p. 467.