Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

134 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
were proposing a temporary working arrangement until the disputes
could be settled. 7
Th e Japanese modus vivendi contained fi ve points: (1) Th e governments
of Japan and of the United States should agree “not to
make any armed advancement” in southeastern Asia or the south
Pacifi c, except in French Indochina, where the Japanese troops
were already stationed; (2) the Japanese government would agree
to withdraw its troops from French Indochina once peace was
established in the Pacifi c, and in the meantime, it would shift
them from southern to northern French Indochina; (3) the two
governments would “cooperate with a view to securing” in the
Netherlands East Indies the various goods and commodities they
might need; (4) the governments would undertake to restore preembargo
commercial relations, and the United States shall supply
Japan “a required quantity of oil”; and (5) the U.S. government, in
turn, should refrain from actions “prejudicial” to the restoration
of general peace between Japan and China. 8
United States Makes a 6-Month
MODUS VIVENDI Counter-Proposal
President Roosevelt expressed his view on the Japanese modus
vivendi in a handwritten note to Hull:
6 months
1. U.S. to resume economic relations—some oil and rice now—
more later.
2. Japan to send no more troops to Indochina or Manchurian
border or any place South (Dutch, Brit. or Siam).
3. Japan to agree not to invoke tripartite pact even if U.S. gets
into European war.
7 Ibid., p. 753.
8 Ibid., pp. 755–56.