Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Modus Vivendi—Yes? No! 133
So throughout the months preceding the Japanese attack, U.S.
offi cials in Washington received a continual fl ow of precise and
accurate information directly from the innermost chambers of
the Japanese government.
However, the Japanese offi cials did not communicate everything
to their representatives abroad, not even to their Washington
ambassadors. So there was still much we did not know about
Japan’s plans and intentions and there was ample room for conjecture,
speculation and interpretation.
Japan Proposes a MODUS VIVENDI
On November 19, Japanese ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu
renewed their conversations with Hull at his apartment. Th e
ambassadors told Hull that Japan was being squeezed economically
by the U.S. embargo and by “our freezing measures”; she
wanted a “quick settlement.” Th ey told Hull they “were momentarily
expecting instructions” from their government. Hull suggested
that “if the Japanese Government could prevail over the
views of the Japanese war party,” it might be possible to “work out
something with us.” 6
By the following day, the ambassadors had received their
instructions and visited Hull again. Nomura said “the Japanese
Government was clearly desirous of peace and that it was trying to
show this peaceful purpose by relieving the pressure on Th ailand.”
It was anxious to resume trade, and to accomplish this, it was
off ering to restrict military operations. Nomura and Kurusu proposed
a modus vivendi. Modus vivendi is Latin meaning a “living
or viable method or measure.” In other words, the ambassadors
6 Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States: Japan, 1931–1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Offi ce, 1943), vol. 2, pp. 751–52.