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Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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Modus Vivendi—Yes? No! 131<br />

to thwart would-be code-breakers. In time, six <strong>of</strong> these machines<br />

were constructed.<br />

For some time, the U.S. code name for Japan had been<br />

“Orange.” Th e machine used for decoding a previous Japanese<br />

cipher had been known as the “Red” machine. So in the tradition<br />

<strong>of</strong> color code names, this new machine was called “Purple.”<br />

Th e fi rst “Purple” machine was retained in Washington.<br />

When additional machines became available, they were distributed<br />

to stations where they were expected to be most valuable.<br />

Th e Navy retained one, the Army two. Th e others were sent to<br />

comm<strong>and</strong>ers in the fi eld where confl ict with Japan seemed possible.<br />

Two machines were sent to Engl<strong>and</strong>, one <strong>of</strong> which was later<br />

forwarded to Singapore. Another machine went to Corregidor in<br />

the Philippines. Because personnel was limited there <strong>and</strong> because<br />

atmospheric conditions prevented picking up more than about<br />

10 percent <strong>of</strong> the Tokyo-Washington messages, the Philippines<br />

h<strong>and</strong>led primarily local traffi c. 1 No “Purple” machine was ever<br />

sent to Hawaii. Th e <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> comm<strong>and</strong>ers had to rely for<br />

intelligence about the Japanese on radio directional fi ndings they<br />

could pick up <strong>and</strong> on reports relayed to them from Washington.<br />

Intercepting <strong>and</strong> decoding a Japanese message was only the<br />

fi rst step on the road to turning it into useful intelligence. Once<br />

deciphered, an intercept had to be translated into English. But<br />

this translation was not “intelligence”; it was only raw material.<br />

To become useful “intelligence,” it had to be properly analyzed<br />

<strong>and</strong> interpreted. Th en it had to reach those who could use it to<br />

advantage. And all this had to be accomplished without the enemy’s<br />

knowledge.<br />

1 Percy L. Greaves, Jr., “Th e <strong>Pearl</strong> <strong>Harbor</strong> Investigations,” in Harry Elmer Barnes,<br />

ed., Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1953),<br />

p. 410; David Kahn, Th e Codebreakers: Th e Story <strong>of</strong> Secret Writing (London:<br />

Weidenfeld <strong>and</strong> Nicholson, 1967), p. 23. See also Laurence F. Saff ord, twohour<br />

tape, notes in author’s possession.

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