Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

126 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Hull responded by raising the China question, which had
long been a sticking point between the two countries. Would
the Japanese be willing to forgo annexation and indemnities, and
to respect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as
the principle of equality? Nomura replied that they would be.
Hull then asked how many soldiers the Japanese would be willing
to withdraw from China. “Possibly 90 per cent,” the ambassador
replied. And how long did the Japanese intend to keep that
remaining 10 percent in China? Th e ambassador did not reply
directly but “invited attention to the fact that under the existing
Boxer Protocol, Japan was permitted to retain troops in the
Peiping and Tientsin area.”
Th e next topic was Indochina. When Japan moved troops into
that country in July, U.S.-Japanese conversations were interrupted
and shipments of petroleum products were discontinued. Kurusu
said Japan intended to withdraw her troops from Indochina “as
soon as a just Pacifi c settlement should be reached.” He asked
about the possibility of the United States’s ending the sanctions
in the meantime. Hull said he would consult the British and the
Dutch on this suggestion. 27
Th e Japanese were tired of fi ghting China, Kurusu added, and
she would go as far as she could in taking the fi rst step toward
peace. Nevertheless, the U.S. government refused to make any
concessions about aid to China. Th e situation was complicated by
Japan’s military alliance with Germany. Both England and Russia
wanted Japan thoroughly occupied with her war in China so that
she could not become an active ally of Germany, which would
put at risk Britain’s possessions in Asia and Russia’s far eastern
territory. Th us U.S. aid to China was, in eff ect, aid to England
and Russia.
27 Ibid., pp. 744–50. Memorandum of Hull’s November 18, 1941 conversation
with Japanese ambassadors.