Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Talk of Ultimatums and Deadlines 125
like a powder keg.” He repeated that some way must be found
to avoid war and assured the president that Prime Minister Tojo
was also “very desirous of bringing about a peaceful adjustment
notwithstanding he is an Army man.” 25
Meanwhile, that very afternoon Hull received a cable from
Ambassador Grew in Japan. Grew warned that there was “need
to guard against sudden Japanese naval or military actions” outside
the area of the Chinese theater of operations. It was likely, he
said, that the Japanese might take “every possible tactical advantage,
such as surprise and initiative.” Japan maintained “extremely
eff ective control over both primary and secondary military information,”
so the embassy’s fi eld of observation was “restricted
almost literally to what could be seen with the naked eye, and
this is negligible.” Th is meant that the U.S. embassy’s naval and
military attaches could not be relied on to send “substantial warning.”
Th e Japanese, therefore, were “assured of the ability to send
without foreign observation their troop transports in various
directions.” 26
The Japanese Ambassadors Continue
Trying for Agreement
Th e two Japanese ambassadors were back at the State
Department the following day. Th eir deadline (November 25) was
approaching, and their immediate concern was the diffi cult position
of the Japanese under the U.S.-imposed trade restrictions and
asset-freeze. Th ey pointed out that Japan was much more dependent
on foreign trade than the United States; she was “hardpressed,”
and thus “desirous” of reaching some agreement.
25 Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United
States: Japan, 1931–1941, vol. 2, pp. 740–43.
26 Ibid., pp. 743–44.