Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

124 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
Let us suppose that the Japanese-U.S. negotiations for the
adjustment of relations between the two countries which are
being conducted at present, unfortunately break down. . . . It is
most probable that diplomatic relations between the two countries
would be broken off immediately. . . . I presume that the
government has given careful consideration as to the disposition
of the various offi ces and our nationals residing here. I
would appreciate being advised in confi dence of your decision
in these matters. 23
Tokyo answered the following day:
…[Y]ou may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the
eff orts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by
the slender thread of a few days, so please fi ght harder than you
ever did before. . . . I set the deadline for the solution of these
negotiations in my #736, and there will be no change. Please
try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore,
do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the
negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis
of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate
solution. 24
We decoded, translated, and read both messages on November
17.
Nomura presented Japan’s newly arrived second ambassador,
Kurusu, to Secretary of State Hull on November 17. Th e three
men then proceeded to the White House so that Kurusu might be
received formally by the president. After the courtesies were over,
Roosevelt brought up the serious misunderstandings between the
two countries and expressed his desire to avoid war. Th e ambassadors
said they equally wished for a peaceful settlement in the
Pacifi c. In Kurusu’s words, “[A]ll the way across the Pacifi c it was
23 Ibid., p. 133. Washington to Tokyo, #1098.
24 Ibid., pp. 137–38. Tokyo to Washington, unnumbered dispatch.