Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Talk of Ultimatums and Deadlines 123
In a further attempt to bring about an amicable settlement,
Japan sent to Washington a second ambassador, Admiral Saburu
Kurusu, to assist Nomura. Kurusu, with an American wife, was
pro-American. Kurusu’s association with the U.S. dated back to
World War I when the two countries were allies. Th e U.S. government
facilitated priority passage for him and for the Japanese
Foreign Offi ce secretary who accompanied him to the United
States via a Pan American plane. 20 Kurusu arrived in Washington
on November 15. His instructions were to
cooperate with [Nomura] in an unsparing eff ort to guide the
negotiations to any early settlement. Th at is my fervent prayer
which I hope may be granted. . . . [T]he crisis is fast approaching.
. . . [D]o everything in your power to make the United
States come to the realization that it is indeed a critical situation.
I beg of you to make every eff ort to have them cooperate
with us in assuring peace on the Pacifi c. 21
On November 15 our Navy decoders deciphered and translated
a Japanese “Purple” intercept reminding the Japanese ambassador
in Washington “that the date [November 25] set forth in
my message #736 is an absolutely immovable one. Please, therefore,
make the United States see the light, so as to make possible
the signing of the agreement by that date.” 22
Nomura immediately cabled Tokyo. He was concerned about
what would happen to the Japanese nationals residing in the
United States:
20 Department of State, Peace and War, p. 137. See also Department of State,
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931–1941
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1943), vol. 2, p. 362.
21 Joint Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack, part 12, pp. 130–31. Tokyo to Washington,
#781, November 15, 1941.
22 Ibid., p. 130. Tokyo to Washington, #775.