Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

122 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
a carefully guarded secret. Th e small number of copies made had
been distributed only to a select few military and administration
offi cials. However, if it was to be intelligently implemented, the
offi cers who would be involved had to know about it. Th erefore,
War Plans Division (WPD) prepared a strategic estimate of
the situation, which it circulated in mid-November among War
Department offi cials. 18
In spite of the careful security surrounding WPD’s estimate,
news of the “Victory Program” leaked out. A rumor circulated
in November that an American expeditionary force (AEF) was
being planned. If true, this was contrary to Marshall’s testimony
before Congress in July when testifying on the extension of
Selective Service. At that time, he had discounted any threat of
militarism and assured Congress that he was not considering an
AEF, but merely “task forces” of 5,000, 15,000, or 30,000 men.
Marshall issued a categorical denial to scotch the rumor about
an AEF: “Th ere is no foundation whatsoever for the allegation or
rumor that we are preparing troops for a possible expedition to
Africa or other critical areas outside this hemisphere.” 19
The Japanese Push for Agreement
Th e seriousness of the Japanese deadline became increasingly
apparent to anyone reading the secret “Purple” dispatches during
this period. Japan was sending Nomura repeated reminders of
the need for urgency. She realized she had to reach some agreement
with the United States. And with this in mind, Ambassador
Nomura and representatives of the U.S. State Department continued
their discussions.
18 Mark Skinner Watson, Th e War Department: Chief of Staff : Prewar Plans and
Preparations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Historical Division,
1950), pp. 220–31, 358.
19 Ibid., p. 359.