Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Talk of Ultimatums and Deadlines 121
November 7 meeting, Stimson wrote, “Th e Far Eastern situation
was uppermost in many of our minds.” Hull reported that U.S.
relations with Japan had become “extremely critical and that we
should be on the outlook for an attack by Japan at any time.” But,
as Marshall and Stark had stated in no uncertain terms in their
memorandum to FDR just two days before, the military were
anxious to avoid becoming involved in any action with Japan at
that time. Nevertheless, according to Stimson’s diary, “our military
advisors . . . had urged military action if Japan attacked . . .
American, British or Dutch territory.” In anticipation that we
might be called on to take some such action under the Singapore
agreement with the British and Dutch, the military had been fl ying
heavy B-17 bombers out to the Philippines for some time,
whenever they could be spared from other duties. None of the
cabinet members except Hull and Stimson knew of this ongoing
buildup.
Roosevelt took “an informal vote” of the cabinet members on
how the American people might react “if it became necessary to
strike at Japan, in case she should attack England in Malaya or
the Dutch in the East Indies.” According to Stimson’s diary, “Th e
Cabinet was unanimous in the feeling that the country would
support such a move,” that is, a strike against Japan if she were to
attack the British or Dutch in southeast Asia. 17
News of “Victory Program” Leaks;
Marshall Denies Its Existence
Th e all-encompassing “Victory Program,” prepared at the
Roosevelt’s request had been completed by September 10. It contained
estimates of the military needs of the United States and her
potential allies, and of the military stocks available worldwide to
win a war in which this country was not as yet offi cially involved.
Th e details and the very existence of the “Victory Program” was
17 Ibid., part 11, p. 5420.