Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

118 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured.
Th en, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the
brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure of the pending
discussions will have an immense eff ect on the destiny of the
Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on
the throw of this die. 14
Japan was announcing that a break in the relations with the
United States was imminent. And the top U.S. political and
military offi cials who were cleared to read the secret intelligence
known as MAGIC knew it.
Stark and Marshall Memorandum to FDR:
Avoid War with Japan;
Issue No Ultimatum to Japan
As agreed at the November 3 meeting of the Joint Board,
Marshall and Stark prepared a memorandum for the president,
briefi ng him in some detail with respect to the Far East situation.
One by one they pointed out the various reasons why the United
States should not issue an ultimatum to Japan that might force
her to take drastic action involving the United States in a Pacifi c
war:
1. Th e U.S. fl eet in the Pacifi c was inferior to the Japanese
fl eet and was not in a position to undertake an unlimited strategic
off ensive in the western Pacifi c.
2. U.S. military forces in the Philippines were not yet strong
enough. Th ey were being reinforced, however, and it was
expected that air and submarine strength would be built up
by mid-December and that the air forces would reach their
projected strength by February or March 1942.
14 Ibid., part 12, pp. 92–93. November 4, 1941 cable #725 from Tokyo to Washington.
Translated November 4, 1941.