Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

116 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
at the time for lack of certain major naval units then in the
repair yards. He recommended that off ensive action in the Far
East be deferred until U.S. military strength was built up in the
Philippines. From what he said, it was obvious that the U.S. military
was not eager to provoke a confrontation with Japan. “[T]he
present moment was not the opportune time to get brash.” 10
Army and Navy Oppose Ultimatum to Japan
Until Phillippine Strength is Developed
Army Chief of Staff Marshall was also at this November 3
meeting. He said he had received information to the eff ect that
the Japanese expected to decide in a couple of days—that would
be by November 5—what action they would take. He “emphasized”
that it would be dangerous to move the “augmented Army
Air Force” away from its present station in the Philippines for
he believed that as long as it was there the Japanese would fi nd
action against the Philippines or towards the south to be “a very
hazardous operation.” Moreover, he expected the Army forces in
the Philippines would be of “impressive strength” by mid-December
and “this in itself would have a deterrent eff ect on Japanese
operations.” 11
It was Marshall’s position that, until U.S. power was suffi -
ciently developed in the Philippines so we would “have something
to back up our statements,” the Japanese should not be
antagonized unnecessarily. Th e United States should “make certain
minor concessions which the Japanese could use in saving
face,” such as “a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade
restrictions.” 12 However, he realized that until U.S. forces were
built up in the Far East, the situation was delicate.
10 Ibid., Ingersoll remark at Joint Army-Navy Board November 3 meeting.
11Ibid. 12 Ibid., part 14, p. 1064.