Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Talk of Ultimatums and Deadlines 115
Another meeting was held at the State Department the following
day. At that time it was proposed that the British send
some planes to Th ailand and that Japan be warned against moving
into Siberia. 7 On November 3 the Joint Board of the Army
and Navy met. Fifteen top Army and Navy offi cers were present.
Th e deliberations were strictly confi dential; no hint of them
was made public. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral
Royal E. Ingersoll, reviewed the far eastern situation. He said that
a decision had been made several months before “to make the
major eff ort in the Atlantic, and if forced to fi ght in the Pacifi c,
to engage in a limited off ensive eff ort.” Th is was consistent with
the U.S.-British Staff Conversations Report (ABC-1) of March
27, 1941. A major war eff ort in the Pacifi c, Ingersoll pointed out,
“would require an enormous amount of shipping, which would
have to come from the Atlantic and other essential areas,” and
this “would materially aff ect United States aid to England.” Even
if the fl eet could be moved to the Far East, he continued, there
were no repair facilities at Manila or Singapore. 8
Ingersoll then assessed the possibility of a Japanese attack.
“Japan is capable of launching an attack in fi ve directions; viz.,
against Russia, the Philippines, into Yunnan, Th ailand and
against Malaya.” He gave his recommendations as to what the
United States should do in each of these fi ve eventualities. “In
case of Japanese attack against either the Philippines or British
and Dutch positions, the United States should resist the attack.
In case of Japanese attack against Siberia, Th ailand or China
through Yunnan, the United States should not declare war.” 9
Ingersoll felt “the State Department was under the impression
that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks.”
However, he pointed out, our fl eet was “seriously handicapped”
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., part 14, pp. 1063–64.
9 Ibid., part 14, p. 1064.