Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ... Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

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Talk of Ultimatums and Deadlines 113 Th eodore Roosevelt; World War I aviator Edward Rickenbacker; Lillian Gish, star of the early fi lms; Socialist Norman Th omas; and aviator Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh. 3 Lindbergh, a national hero ever since his dramatic solo fl ight across the Atlantic in 1927, became America First’s most popular spokesman. When he spoke at New York’s Manhattan Center on April 23, 1941, the hall was jammed with 5,500 people. In subsequent appearances— New York, Minneapolis, St. Louis, Philadelphia, Hollywood, Cleveland, Des Moines, Fort Wayne—he attracted even larger enthusiastic crowds, up to 22,000. 4 Others were also working to maintain peace with Japan. Among them were religious groups, the Friends, or Quakers, and the followers of the Reverend E. Stanley Jones, a well-known Methodist missionary. Reverend Jones believed the Japanese were tired of fi ghting in China and were ready to make peace. He hoped to act as a “catalyst,” to help the various parties reconcile their diff erences, and had approached high Japanese and Chinese offi cials informally to learn their reaction to his suggestions. He had talked with offi cials in the U.S. State Department, and his suggestions had been transmitted by memoranda to the president. He wanted FDR to send a personal cable to the Emperor. Jones had also spoken to groups of ministers, usually fi nding them receptive to his ideas. By November 1941, Jones seemed to be making some progress with his suggestions. Th e pro-peace noninterventionists, however, were gradually being overwhelmed by the pro-British propaganda emanating from the administration and the mass communications media— radio, movies, newsreels, and major newspapers and magazines. Although the majority of the people in the United States still did 3For an account of the America First Committee, see Wayne S. Cole, America First: Th e Battle Against Intervention, 1940–1941 (New York: Octagon Books, 1971). 4E. Eastman Irving, ed., Th e World Almanac (New York: New York World- Telegram, 1942), pp. 62, 75, 78.

114 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy not want this country to become involved in the war, the climate of opinion was gradually shifting. Antiwar sentiment was beginning to decline. Washington’s Far Eastern Policy —Warn Japan, Delay Operations to Allow U.S. Build-up in Pacific Rather than wanting to conciliate Japan, Secretary of State Hull was in favor of issuing an additional warning. Before doing so, however, he sought to determine the Army’s and Navy’s state of readiness. Would the military authorities be ready to support further State Department warnings? On November 1 the State Department held a meeting on the far eastern situation. Messages from Generalissimo Chiang Kai- Shek, China’s head of government at Chungking, and General John Magruder, chief of the American military mission to Chungking, were discussed. Chiang was urging that the United States warn Japan against attacking China through Yunnan, a province in southern China. To present the Navy viewpoint, Chief of Naval Operations Stark and Captain Schuirmann, the Navy liaison with the State Department, were present. Th ey pointed out that Japan had already been warned. Th e president had told Japan on August 17, when he returned from meeting Churchill at Argentia, that if she continued military aggression against her “neighboring countries,” the United States would be “compelled” to take action. 5 According to Schuirmann, Hull “desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department.” 6 5 Department of State, Peace and War, pp. 713–14. FDR’s oral statement to the Japanese ambassador, August 17, 1941. 6 79th Cong., 1st sess. Joint (Congressional) Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. Pearl Harbor Attack, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Offi ce, 1946), part 14, p. 1063.

Talk <strong>of</strong> Ultimatums <strong>and</strong> Deadlines 113<br />

Th eodore Roosevelt; World War I aviator Edward Rickenbacker;<br />

Lillian Gish, star <strong>of</strong> the early fi lms; Socialist Norman Th omas;<br />

<strong>and</strong> aviator Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh. 3 Lindbergh, a national<br />

hero ever since his dramatic solo fl ight across the Atlantic in<br />

1927, became America First’s most popular spokesman. When<br />

he spoke at New York’s Manhattan Center on April 23, 1941, the<br />

hall was jammed with 5,500 people. In subsequent appearances—<br />

New York, Minneapolis, St. Louis, Philadelphia, Hollywood,<br />

Clevel<strong>and</strong>, Des Moines, Fort Wayne—he attracted even larger<br />

enthusiastic crowds, up to 22,000. 4<br />

Others were also working to maintain peace with Japan.<br />

Among them were religious groups, the Friends, or Quakers, <strong>and</strong><br />

the followers <strong>of</strong> the Reverend E. Stanley Jones, a well-known<br />

Methodist missionary. Reverend Jones believed the Japanese<br />

were tired <strong>of</strong> fi ghting in China <strong>and</strong> were ready to make peace. He<br />

hoped to act as a “catalyst,” to help the various parties reconcile<br />

their diff erences, <strong>and</strong> had approached high Japanese <strong>and</strong> Chinese<br />

<strong>of</strong>fi cials informally to learn their reaction to his suggestions. He<br />

had talked with <strong>of</strong>fi cials in the U.S. State Department, <strong>and</strong> his<br />

suggestions had been transmitted by memor<strong>and</strong>a to the president.<br />

He wanted FDR to send a personal cable to the Emperor.<br />

Jones had also spoken to groups <strong>of</strong> ministers, usually fi nding<br />

them receptive to his ideas. By November 1941, Jones seemed to<br />

be making some progress with his suggestions.<br />

Th e pro-peace noninterventionists, however, were gradually<br />

being overwhelmed by the pro-British propag<strong>and</strong>a emanating<br />

from the administration <strong>and</strong> the mass communications media—<br />

radio, movies, newsreels, <strong>and</strong> major newspapers <strong>and</strong> magazines.<br />

Although the majority <strong>of</strong> the people in the United States still did<br />

3For an account <strong>of</strong> the America First Committee, see Wayne S. Cole, America<br />

First: Th e Battle Against Intervention, 1940–1941 (New York: Octagon Books,<br />

1971).<br />

4E. Eastman Irving, ed., Th e World Almanac (New York: New York World-<br />

Telegram, 1942), pp. 62, 75, 78.

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