Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy - Ludwig von Mises ...

110 Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy
to the Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii—they were not
even informed of their existence.
To complete the record, it might be pointed out that intercepted
Japanese cables revealed to our authorities in Washington
that the Japanese were also watching ship movements in Manila.
Some 59 messages were exchanged between Tokyo and the
Philippines; all but two were deciphered and translated before
December 7. Twenty-seven cables reporting on ship movements
in and out of the Panama Canal were intercepted to and from
Tokyo, 21 of which were deciphered and read before the attack
on Pearl Harbor. We also intercepted eight Japanese cables
between Tokyo and the west coast (San Francisco and Seattle),
another eight that referred to southeast Asia and the Dutch East
Indies, and a couple each concerning Vancouver (Canada) and
Vladivostok (Russia). 74
Th e record shows that the ships in Pearl Harbor were those
most closely under surveillance. Yet no hint was ever given
Kimmel or Short that the Japanese, from September 24 on, were
plotting regularly on grid charts the locations and movements of
ships in Pearl Harbor, and forwarding this information to Tokyo.
Nor was any hint ever given Kimmel or Short that as of mid-
November, the Japanese consul had been asked to make these
reports more frequently, “at a rate of twice a week,” or that he had
been asked on November 29 to report “even when there are no
ship movements.” In spite of Kimmel’s several requests for intelligence
and in spite of the repeated reassurances that he would
be kept informed, none of these vital intercepts was forwarded to
the Pearl Harbor commanders before the attack.
74 Ibid., part 12, pp. 254, 270–316.